Download Citation on ResearchGate | Content and Self-Knowledge | La these Pastist externalists (e.g., Boghossian ; Burge ) maintain that the past. Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring Philosophy of Mind. Paul A. Boghossian. Pages DOI: /philtopics Content and Self-Knowledge. Content and Self-Knowledge. Paul A. Boghossian University of Michigan. INTRODUCTION I. This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis.
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This is because 3 is empirical and it is conceded that 2 presupposes 3 cf.
Externalism and Self-Knowledge
Consider a world much like this one, where H 2 O fills the lakes and rivers, etc. Find it on Scholar. If so, skeptical slow switch arguments end up being incoherent. Self-Knowledge is Empirical 2. Consequently, on either horn of the dilemma, SK is threatened Brueckner Cambridge University Press, pp.
Yet the foremost arguments for the view are not so parochial. And thus SK is false in this case too. Yet the objection may beg the question of how memory should function Ludlow In which case, the environmental difference creates a difference in form as well as content.
But is the tension real? Now in fact, this raises the extremely important question of whether such discriminations are necessary for self-knowledge, but further discussion will be delayed until section 3. Yet there are actual examples which also illustrate the point Ludlow b; see also ButlerTye So the apriority of 1 is not guaranteed here, and the reductio seems in doubt.
Following Meditation Twoeven if an evil demon is deceiving me, it still seems I can know what I am currently thinking. Science Logic and Mathematics. So already there is a problem with armchair self-knowledge, absent any premises about memory.
Paul A. Boghossian, Content and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers
As concerns the A to B maneuver, Burge protests that this glosses over an especially secure type of armchair self-knowledge. Self-Verifying Judgments As concerns the A to B maneuver, Burge protests that this glosses over an especially secure type of armchair self-knowledge. Premise a is seen as a platitude about memory though some deny this; see section 3.
One is to be neutral contenf whether 3 is apriori warranted.
Content and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind
The claim is that EXT and SK jointly entail an obvious falsehood, namely, that Oscar can know from the armchair contingent facts about the external world McKinsey ; ; ;BrownBoghossian ; But E is an environmental condition that presumably can only be known empirically. A final line against SK is that, if 1 is not apriori as is plausibleit follows that apriori knowledge of 2 is impossible Gertler So what was a genuine memory fontent displaced by a false memory.
So CW is satisfied in this case. BeebeeBurge Then, the presupposition charge is most readily appreciated via the following approximation: For more, see Fernandez as well as the entry on two-dimensional semantics.
W I am thinking, with this very thought, that water is wet. Yet in light of bogbossian resistance, Boghossian formulates a different version of the slow switch argument.
Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Externalism and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind categorize this paper. Oscar is thinking that water self-khowledge wet. Some externalists have even offered independent arguments to that effect Putnam After all, this putative warrant dissipates immediately once any earnest doubt is raised Wright b, yet contrast with Wright ; Scepticism About Knowledge of Content.
Yet incompatibilists reply that the second reading cannot be self-knowldege is really intended. As Burgep. So it seems incorrect to say that 2 is something known.
The externalist is thus asked to rule out deviant thought contents from the armchair.