CNSC welcomes feedback on any regulatory document at any time REGDOC- supersedes RD, Design of New Nuclear Power. CNSC has issued its Fukushima report – posted on the CNSC website on that the design intent complies with CNSC design requirements (RD, RD-. Re: The Approvals Process for New Reactors in Canada – RD & RD ( CNSC) request for feedback on the comments received on the.
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All pressure-retaining SSCs are protected against overpressure conditions, and are classified, designed, fabricated, erected, inspected, and tested in accordance with established standards. The following design provisions demonstrate that the above life safety objectives have been achieved:. If software rd3-37 by a third-party vendor is used in systems or equipment important to safety, then the software-and any subsequent release of the software-is developed, inspected, and tested in accordance with standards of a category commensurate with the safety function provided by the given system or equipment.
Where needed, codes and standards may be supplemented or modified to ensure that the final quality of the design is commensurate with the necessary safety functions.
Safety assessment documentation is presented clearly and concisely, in a logical and understandable format, and will be made readily accessible to designers, operators, and the CNSC. Fire suppression systems are designed and located such that rupture, or spurious or inadvertent operation, will not significantly impair the capability of SSCs important to safety.
Development and implementation of this program ensures that the following functions are carried out in post-accident conditions:. The potential for common-cause failures of items important to safety is considered in determining where to apply the principles of diversity, separation, and independence to achieve the necessary reliability.
The design addresses the potential for accidents to chsc when the availability of safety systems may be reduced, such as during shutdown, start-up, low power operation, refuelling, and maintenance. A hazards analysis demonstrates the ability of the design to effectively respond to credible common-cause events. Skip to main content Skip to footer. The design extends the capability to transfer residual heat from the core to an ultimate heat sink so that, in the event of a severe accident:.
Where MSIVs provide a containment barrier, they meet the containment requirements that apply to those cncs for which they are credited.
Seismic fragility levels should be evaluated for SSCs important to safety by analysis or, where possible, by testing. Where failure of a closed loop is assumed to be a PIE or the result of a PIE, the isolations for dnsc coolant system auxiliaries apply.
In addition, the means for adding or modifying the chemical constituents of fluid streams are specified. The design demonstrates through process, monitoring, control, prevention, and mitigation measures, that the releases of nuclear and hazardous substances will conform to the ALARA principle.
A review of the design confirms that this provision has been met. The design should be balanced such that no particular design feature or event makes a dominant contribution to the frequency of severe accidents, taking uncertainties into account. Pressure boundary A boundary of any pressure-retaining vessel, system, or component of a nuclear or non-nuclear system. The design of the MCR takes ergonomic factors into account to provide both physical and visual accessibility to controls and displays, without adverse impact on health and comfort.
The design enables heat removal and pressure reduction in the reactor containment in all plant states. Such points include storm sewers, culverts, service piping, and cable routing that could be used to gain access to the facility.
The design authority identifies the modern standards and codes that will be used for the plant design, and evaluates those standards and codes for applicability, adequacy, and sufficiency to the design of SSCs important to safety.
The ability of the containment system to withstand loads associated with severe ncsc is demonstrated in design documentation, and includes the following considerations:. Complementary design features include design or procedural considerations, or both, and are based on a combination of phenomenological models, engineering judgments, and probabilistic methods. When an NPP is under construction adjacent to an operating plant, and sharing of SSCs between reactors has been justified, the availability of the SSCs and their capacity to meet all safety requirements for the operating units is assessed during the construction phase.
Such assessments are most useful in assessing the relative level of safety.
RD Design of New Nuclear Power Plants – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
The radiation protection objective is to provide that during normal operation, or during anticipated operational occurrences, radiation exposures within the NPP or due to any planned release of radioactive material from the NPP are kept below prescribed limits and as low as reasonably achievable ALARA.
Particular attention is placed on the prevention of potential containment bypass in accidents involving significant core degradation. All pressure boundary piping and vessels are separated from electrical and control systems to the greatest extent practicable.
Each line that connects directly to the containment atmosphere, that penetrates the containment structure and is not part of a closed system, is to be provided with two isolation barriers that meet fd-337 following expectations:. The reactor control mechanisms limit the positive reactivity insertion rate to a level csc to control reactivity changes and power manoeuvring. The OLCs are documented in a manner that is readily accessible for control room personnel, with the roles and responsibilities clearly identified.
Systems directly connected to the reactor coolant system that may be open during normal operation are subject to the same isolation expectations as the normally closed system, with the exception that manual isolating valves inside the containment structure will not be used.
Human-induced external events include those that are identified in the site evaluation, such as potential aircraft crashes, ship collisions, and terrorist activities.
This provision is essential to maintaining the leak tightness of the containment in the cns of an accident, and preventing radioactive releases to the environment that exceed prescribed limits. To demonstrate achievement of the safety objectives, a comprehensive hazard analysis, a deterministic safety analysis, and a probabilistic safety assessment are carried out.
Document History of REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants
With the defence-in-depth approach, if a failure were to occur it will be detected and compensation made, or it would be corrected. The emergency support centre design ensures that appropriate lighting levels and thermal environment are maintained, and that noise levels are minimized to applicable standards and codes.
The principle of fail-safe design is applied to the design of SSCs important to safety. Alternative types of isolation may be used where justification is provided.